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Why Manmohan kicked out Tytler

Why Manmohan kicked out Tytler

Nav · 13 Aug 2005

http://www.sikhsangat.com/index.php?showtopic=12935&st=24 PM faced excommunication threat 13 August 2005: Threatened with excommunication from the Sikh community, Manmohan Singh met Sonia Gandhi with the choice that either Jagdish Tytler would have to resign or he would have to quit, following which the overseas Indians’ minister, an accused in the 1984 anti-Sikh riots, was asked to leave the government. But in his anger, Tytler did not give his resignation letter to the prime minister, but asked Sonia to forward it to him, and since then, he has been speaking unprintably about Manmohan Singh. Top agency and party sources said that the PM got wind of the move to excommunicate him, a fate suffered by Buta Singh earlier, and he told Sonia that he would not be able to live down such an event, cut off from his community just so he would remain prime minister. Those who argued to excommunicate him said that if, as a Sikh prime minister, Manmohan could not get justice for the community, there was no reason to feel satisfied with his elevation to the high office, and Sonia’s response was that she would do what was necessary. Soon afterwards, Manmohan Singh in his Parliament speech clearly hinted that Tytler would leave his government, but till the evening, he was not willing to budge, after which he was asked by Sonia Gandhi’s office to put in his papers. Congress party sources said that Tytler was being supported by Sonia’s coterie members Ahmed Patel, Ambika Soni, Janardhan Divedi, and ministers like Ghulam Nabi Azad, and Priyaranjan Das Munshi.

Re: Why Manmohan kicked out Tytler

search for tat · 13 Aug 2005

shows that Manmohan singh has more feeling for his community and Panth than badal and co have ever had. Tytler will not just sit down, he will get the knives out against Manmohan singh.

Re: Why Manmohan kicked out Tytler

SS · 13 Aug 2005

Hindustan Times Riots and the politics of discord COUNTERPOINT | Vir Sanghvi August 13, 2005 Why do you suppose the Manmohan Singh government completely misjudged the mood of the country over the report of the Nanavati Commission into the 1984 riots? Over the last week, the government has been comprehensively embarrassed on the floor of the House. Its allies have turned against it. The media, by and large supportive of Dr Singh on most issues, have been bitterly critical. A Cabinet minister has been forced out of office. A Congress MP has been made to give up his chairmanship of a government body. Most significant, the regime has damaged its reputation as a government that comprises decent people. The Prime Minister, in particular, has cut a sorry figure: appearing, at first, to go along with the shameful Action Taken Report (or Action Not Taken Report) and then bowing to public pressure and seeking the forgiveness of Parliament and of the country at large. Nobody who is on the outside can ever understand the inner workings of a government. So, I expect, we’ll never know what really went on behind closed doors last week. But let’s look at the mistakes and errors of judgement that contributed to this self-inflicted wound on the government’s reputation. The first factor — and let’s not be shy of admitting this — is that the government is led by a Sikh. Every single Sikh of my acquaintance has bitter memories of the 1984 riots. Many, if not most, know of friends and relatives who suffered during that period. It is reasonable to assume that Dr Singh is no exception. My guess is that if the Nanavati Commission had focused on, say, an anti-Muslim riot, Manmohan Singh would have been much more vocal in demanding action. His own identity as a Sikh worked against him in this case. The Prime Minister is an intensely shy and modest man, always seeking to prove that he is functioning in an entirely objective and impartial manner. At some level, I think, he felt embarrassed to ask for strong action on behalf of the Sikhs who suffered in 1984. The second factor is that there was a complete failure to read the change in public mood. The Nanavati Commission is only the latest in a whole series of bodies that have enquired into the 1984 riots. Though some of these bodies have been critical of the role of Congress leaders during that period, the party has always managed to ride out the storm. When the Nanavati report was presented, Congressmen believed that it would be greeted with the same response as all the other reports: a burst of media attention followed by a total lack of interest. Further, Congressmen genuinely believe that the Nanavati Commission was appointed by the last BJP government in an effort to embarrass the Congress. Thus, they were predisposed to be suspicious of the report even before it was presented. What all of this ignored is that there has been a paradigm shift in the way in which the intelligentsia and the media regard communal riots after the horrors of Gujarat. Most educated Indians were deeply ashamed by the massacres of innocent Muslims (even LK Advani describes Gujarat as a blot on India’s secular record) and resolved to make sure that nothing like that ever happened again. It was inevitable that any enquiry into the Delhi riots would reawaken memories of the Gujarat massacres. And certainly, there are parallels. In both cases, massacres were passed off as riots; the murderers claimed to be acting as vengeful agents of the aggrieved Hindu community; the police force did nothing to protect the victims; there was an unforgivable delay in calling for the army; and many of those who participated in the massacres were political activists attached to the ruling party. The Congress argues that Delhi and Gujarat are intrinsically different because in 1984, the massacres were a consequence of governmental negligence and ineptitude in the aftermath of Indira Gandhi’s assassination, while the Gujarat riots were centrally directed and planned by Narendra Modi and his party colleagues. This may or may not be true. But the other similarities are too striking to be ignored — even if you accept the Congress line that there is a difference between a governmental pogrom and a failure of administrative machinery. In the circumstances, it was foolish to believe (as many political secularists did) that people who were outraged and angered by the Gujarat riots would agree to bury their memories of the Delhi massacres only because — in today’s polarised political scene — the Congress is the secular good guy while the Sangh Parivar is the party of the rath yatra, the Ayodhya demolition and the Gujarat murders. Since the Congress itself had protested so bitterly about the Gujarat violence, it could not seriously expect that people would make an exception for the Delhi riots and agree to judge them by a different yardstick. And yet, the government made the mistake of believing that the country would be willing to condemn Gujarat but forget about Delhi. Thirdly, when you have a government that comprises decent people — and there’s no doubt that Manmohan Singh has his heart in the right place — obvious political calculations tend to be forgotten. If we were to be entirely cynical and to leave morality completely out of any assessment, there is still no doubt that the government blundered badly by producing that pathetic Action Taken Report. A thoroughly professional politician — AB Vajpayee or LK Advani, for instance, or even Narasimha Rao or Indira Gandhi — would have done a quick cost-benefit analysis. The huge political cost of retaining Jagdish Tytler in the Cabinet was obvious. By doing so, the government gave the impression that it regarded its ministers as being above the law. It lost much goodwill among the educated middle class. It risked a fissure with its allies in the Left and in Bihar. It damaged its reputation for decency and morality. The Prime Minister, long regarded as one of the most decent politicians in Indian history, came across as either unfeeling or too weak to act on his instincts. And then, there were the electoral costs. The Congress risked losing the support of Sikh voters all over the country. Not only did the failure to act against Tytler and Sajjan Kumar boost the electoral prospects of the Akalis in Punjab while simultaneously damaging the Congress’s chances, but it also adversely affected the party in many north Indian constituencies where Sikhs form a significant proportion of the electorate. As against these heavy costs, there were relatively few advantages in letting Tytler and Kumar off the hook. Tytler has some support in Delhi but he’s hardly irreplaceable. Nor will thousands of Hindu voters now turn against the party because Tytler has been driven out of a ministry whose very existence few people were aware of to begin with. As for Sajjan Kumar, the laws of libel prevent me from saying very much, but nobody with any knowledge of his background will regard him as a loss to Indian public life. Had Indira Gandhi or Narasimha Rao been in charge, they would have had made these calculations in the blink of an eye and Tytler would have been frog-marched out of his office long before the Action Taken Report was presented to Parliament. The problem with this lot of Congress leaders is that they are too soft to make hard political calculations. I suspect that their reasoning went something like this: well, the judge hasn’t actually recommended the prosecution of Tytler. As for Sajjan Kumar, there have been enquiries conducted by non-Congress governments in the past which have turned up no solid evidence. So why should we make these guys give up their posts on the basis of vague statements made by a judge who was appointed by the BJP government? There is something to be said for this approach when you are running a Sunday school or planning a class picnic. But it is of very little use in the rough and tumble of Indian politics. In these situations, Manmohan Singh needs to learn from the pragmatic ruthlessness of his BJP predecessor, Atal Behari Vajpayee. And finally, there is the matter of closure. What annoys Indians most is that whenever politicians are involved, ordinary people never get justice. The widows of Delhi have waited 21 years to see the men who murdered their husbands get their comeuppance. We have come to believe that when political activists massacre ordinary citizens — whether it is Delhi in 1984, Bombay in 1993 or Gujarat in 2002 — they remain above the law. We mourn our dead; they get sworn in as ministers. Manmohan Singh had the opportunity to offer us some sense of closure over 1984. I just wish he had seized the moment at the first opportunity.